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Climate Change Preparedness in the Insurance Sector
I. Introduction
It is rare to see an issue which has a truly global impact and will change the course of
human history. Climate change will be such an event, and it will become increasingly severe in
the near future. Assuming humanity is able to adapt and survive on a changing planet, the
repercussions of climate change will be felt in daily life. Rising sea levels and a higher frequency
of more severe weather events will inflict trillions of dollars worth of damage. Aside from the
obvious human toll, there will certainly be impacts on the economy and business. A particular
sector which will be forced to adapt is the property and casualty insurance industry. Insurer
solvency could be an issue as traditional modeling methods using historical data will be less
effective for predicting catastrophes in a climate changed world. Due to such issues, it will be
necessary to adapt to this changing environment in order to maintain the viability of the
insurance business. A successful response to climate change will require a combination of
factors, including, but not limited to, cooperation with the government, promoting insurance
friendly lifestyles for customers, and alternative modeling methods. However, it will be too late
if plans are not preemptively set in motion.
II. Background
Natural disaster related losses are already beginning to increase in recent years compared
to historical averages. Since historical data is an important ingredient in the insurance modeling
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process, there is a great deal of unpredictability regarding these losses. In addition, the risk is
going to vary by country because climate change effects will be quite dependent on geographical
location. The insurance market is dominated by the United States of America, followed by other
developed countries. One nation which has clearly taken notice and given some thought to this
issue is Canada. The National Roundtable on the Economy and the Environment provided
projections for climate costs in various scenarios. According to the report, costs should be
expected, “under a low climate change-slow growth scenario, to grow from $5 billion a year in
2020 to somewhere between $21 billion to $43 billion a year by 2050. Alternatively, under a
high climate change-rapid growth scenario, climate costs could increase to somewhere between
$43 billion to $91 billion annually by 2050” (Dwyer 64). These estimates provide a wide range
of values, showing the uncertainty in estimating climate costs. Current and future emissions will
have a significant impact, as seen below.

Figure 1: Potential emissions scenarios, which are directly correlated to the effects of
climate change (Dwyer 62).
The uncertainty in future emissions is the main reason for the wide range of estimates for future
climate costs. However, the lower end of these ranges still predict a massive increase compared
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to current losses. As a result, insurers will need to find innovative ways of dealing with rising
costs in any emissions scenario. In the future, they can adjust their strategies as the effects of
climate change become more certain.
Analysis of recent insurer responses to catastrophic events is a useful consideration for
determining what will work for the future. Historically, Florida has been a state which has faced
far more catastrophic hurricanes than any other. This susceptibility has forced insurers to rethink
their approach to Florida in recent years. The wake up call leading to this change was Hurricane
Andrew, which caused the largest amount of damage in history at the time it occurred. This
disaster made it clear that insurers were seriously underestimating catastrophe exposure, which is
certainly a concern for climate change related catastrophes in the future. One response which
was widely used among insurers is a hurricane deductible, which “moved the cost burden more
to customers and less to the insurance company. The downside for the consumer, he said, is that
many people may not have enough damage to their home to meet their deductible and can get
stuck paying out of pocket for repairs” (O’Connor). So while this method is successful for
reducing exposure for the insurer and keeping premiums reasonable, it can result in less people
benefiting from their insurance. In current times, the higher deductible works well in that it
protects from the most severe storms, which is beneficial for the insured. However, climate
change will cause these storms to become commonplace, which will force deductibles to rise and
the coverage will only really kick in for the most destructive storms imaginable. Herein lies the
problem, as customers are forced to assume a larger dollar amount of the risk, making it less
useful since many will not be able to deal with such losses on their own.
Loss mitigation could be a very effective method for keeping premiums reasonable in a
climate changed world. Insurers already utilize incentives such as safe driving discounts, since
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both parties benefit from safe behavior. The lower risk corresponds to a lower premium for the
insured and a decrease in expected losses for the insurer. The variety of dangers posed by climate
change will force insurers to find specialized methods for mitigating losses. For example, floods
and wildfires cause different damage, so they will require preventative measures specific to the
threat at hand. A potential idea for mitigation of wildfire losses is giving “homeowners insurance
customers access to wildfire-defense services to help them with prevention and mitigation
measures. Services include relocating valuables and deploying certified fire professionals to
homes if a wildfire is approaching” (Grimaldi et al.). Relocation of valuables will likely be a
constant in any loss mitigation measures, because it is less expensive than replacement, and it is
effective for any type of natural disaster. Insurers can build these services into policies or simply
offer incentives to customers who employ safe practices, although this may be less effective at
achieving the goal of loss mitigation.
However, incentives only function as intended if policyholders are honest about their
activities, rather than lying to get cheaper premiums. As a result, insurers must consider the cost
of verifying that customers are truly engaging in safe practice. This is an industry wide concern,
not a concept unique to the issue of climate change. The idea of people behaving less cautiously
when they are protected from the consequences is known as moral hazard. Common methods for
reducing this effect include coinsurance and deductibles, since it exposes the policyholder to
some of the losses. While these traditional methods are useful, they may be less effective in a
climate changed world, since they do not explicitly mitigate losses. As a result, in a climate
change context, “the problem of moral hazard, which consists in prevention incentives being
reduced on the part of the policy holder through the existence of an insurance, is minimised
through the regulation and observation of prevention” (Porrini et al. 11). People tend to be overly
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optimistic and will not sufficiently prepare for a catastrophe on their own, so it will be important
for insurers to take a more proactive approach. If the cost of ensuring prevention is too great to
justify premium incentives, insurers could explicitly require certain measures in dangerous areas
by including them in the policy language. Either way, mitigation should be the top priority for
insurers, since the cost will be well worth it.
III. Legal Solutions
Insurers can carefully control the terms of their policies, because they have all of the
power in setting the terms of the contract. This is known as a contract of adhesion, since the
customer has no ability to bargain for more favorable terms. As touched on previously, this can
be a useful tool for reducing climate change costs by inexpensively enforcing loss mitigation
measures. Insurers can offer lower premiums for policies that require certain prevention efforts
on the part of the policyholder. If it is discovered that these terms were breached, then insurance
companies will have legal grounds to avoid paying for losses in those scenarios. While unrelated
to climate change, COVID-19 has sparked some interesting debate over policy language. In
essence, insurers have been denying business interruption claims resulting from the pandemic,
some of which have been taken to court. Up to this point, “in the 229 cases where courts have
ruled, insurers have succeeded in having about 80% of the cases dismissed, with the majority of
the dismissals coming on policies that had virus exclusions. There have also been a few victories
for insureds where the policies lacked virus exclusions” (Simpson). Clearly, insurers have been
successful in their defense, since courts will enforce unambiguous policy language, such as virus
exclusions. This is promising for insurers, because carefully written insurance contracts with the
goal of minimizing climate change costs should hold up in court.
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If successful, climate litigation would be a useful tool for insurers to avoid some of the
costs of climate related damages. Due to the indirect nature of the issue, there would certainly be
difficulties in proving that carbon polluters are responsible for specific incidents. For example, in
2008, the Village of Kivalina faced hundreds of millions of dollars in relocation costs when their
coastline was eroded by melting sea ice. They attempted litigation against ExxonMobil in order
to recover these costs in court. Unfortunately, “Kivalina’s claim was unsuccessful for a number
of reasons, but most importantly it failed because the District Court held that Kivalina lacked
standing, since there was ‘no realistic possibility of tracing any particular alleged effect of global
warming to any particular emissions by any specific person, entity, [or] group at any particular
point in time’” (Dwyer 72-73). This decision does not bode well for any future possibilities of
climate litigation. Proving causation is a significant impediment, since it is impossible to say that
certain carbon emissions caused a specific catastrophe. Climate change is a large scale issue,
with the individual natural disasters being its manifestation. As a result, climate litigation is not a
particularly promising legal avenue in the future. Insurers should look to more viable options for
managing the costs of climate change.
Climate legislation is another option for mandating carbon polluters to pay for climate
change related damages. Continuing with Canada as an example, tobacco legislation should be a
useful precedent, since these issues have many similarities. Tobacco companies misled the public
about the health effects of smoking, and carbon polluters deceived the public regarding the
environmental impact of greenhouse gas emissions. The concern with climate litigation is “that
insurers and carbon polluters will simply frustrate the process of climate litigation in a manner
similar to how tobacco companies successfully defended litigation for decades” (Dwyer 78). It
was tobacco legislation that finally broke through and allowed the government to recoup the
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healthcare costs of tobacco related disease. Due to the similarity of these issues, the government
could use similar arguments for recovering costs due to climate change related damages. For
example, tobacco use increases the likelihood of certain diseases, and greenhouse gas emissions
increases the frequency and severity of natural disasters. Tobacco legislation “solved many of the
issues relating to causation and the apportionment of damages, which are two of the biggest
hurdles in the climate context” (Dwyer 80-81). Apportionment is a complex problem, since the
government will need to decide how far in the past is appropriate for considering the emissions
of each carbon polluter. In addition, it is difficult to estimate the damages, since they will be
incurred in the future. There are many hurdles to overcome, but climate legislation is likely the
most promising legal option.
If climate legislation becomes a reality in the future, then the government will need to
determine the most efficient way of allocating the collected damages. One option would be to
funnel it through disaster relief programs. However, repeated catastrophes in vulnerable areas
will result in wasting of funds. In fact, “studies show that adaptation and mitigation spending
will save more money in the long run and lead to more efficient results. These additional funds
could be used to improve flood plain mapping, help build above code, or improve deficient
infrastructure” (Dwyer 84). An international focus on minimizing damages would be excellent
for insurance companies, since it would protect them against catastrophic losses. If mitigation
measures are successfully implemented, then disaster relief can act as a useful complement for
insurance coverage, rather than wasting funds. For example, if a claimant receives a payment
from the government after incurring a loss, this would effectively serve as a deductible for their
insurance from the perspective of the insurer. Premiums can remain reasonable as insurers can
offer high deductible policies, while still providing useful coverage for the insured. This is one
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example showing that “the interplay between disaster relief funding and private insurance
provides the potential for a number of creative solutions to maintain comprehensive coverage
despite increasingly unpredictable risk” (Dwyer 87). Of course, it is somewhat idealistic to
expect such a strong program to come to fruition. In addition, it may be decades before it takes
full effect due to legal hurdles. Insurers will need to find alternative methods in order to be
prepared for a climate change scenario with little governmental assistance.
Due to the difficulties associated with recouping losses, another beneficial approach
would be to enact preventative legislation to curb climate change. This is by far the simplest
solution, since many governments are already committed to reductions in greenhouse gas
emissions. As discussed previously, most of the variability in climate change losses is due to
different potential emissions scenarios. As a result, maintaining a legal commitment to low
emissions scenarios would have a massive impact on the insurance industry in the future and
ensure its viability. Insurers would be well served to call for government action and stir up public
support for preventative climate legislation. Once enacted, “legislation can embed climate
change planning within the administrative structure of a State, ‘locking in’ a policy direction by
tying policy goals into a rule of law framework for governance. This is distinct from government
policies that can be more vulnerable to marginalization or revocation” (Scotford et al. 72). In
other words, legislation is more permanent in that it is difficult to undo when administrations
change, so enacting climate law as soon as possible would be a major success. Of course, this is
easier said than done, since climate change has been made into a political issue. In addition,
carbon polluters will continue to lobby for favorable legislation in order to maximize their
profits. Insurers must take the opposite stance in order to protect their own interests, which are
nicely aligned with the good of the public as well.
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IV. Flood Insurance
Almost all flood insurance is written under the National Flood Insurance Program, which
is run by the Federal Emergency Management Agency, abbreviated as FEMA. Historically, the
program has operated at a significant loss due to premiums not being commensurate with flood
risk. This business model essentially made the program a subsidy in order to keep premiums
reasonable for risky properties. Since insurance companies need to turn a profit, most left the
flood insurance business after it became clear that the risk was too great. Being a government
controlled program, the NFIP has more legal tools at its disposal, since it can require flood
insurance in particularly risky areas, such as floodplains. In addition, “because the federal
government has no control over land-use planning or building codes, which are set by state and
local governments, the flood insurance program is one of its most powerful tools to influence
how and where Americans build homes” (Flavelle). If premiums are set at appropriate levels and
flood insurance is required in dangerous areas, then the high cost of living should be a strong
deterrent to residential development in floodplains. The main concern with this approach is that
rate increases could cause financial harm to existing homeowners. Increased premiums will put a
strain on household income, and home values would decline since there will be very few buyers
interested in such properties.
In order to avoid this system being counterproductive, it is important to find a way to
resolve the economic situation for existing homeowners in floodplains. A home is by far the
most valuable asset owned by the average person, and crashing home values would leave many
families in financial ruin. A promising option is “a ‘discounts for buyouts’ program that would
offer qualifying homeowners a guarantee of a future buyout as a benefit of their flood insurance
coverage, in exchange for a discounted insurance rate” (Adler et al. 10322). The goal of this
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program is to expedite the process of a buyout in order to avoid spending on repairs. A flood
causing significant enough damage to a home will initiate a buyout of the property, which is
subsequently demolished. The homeowners will receive assistance in moving to a safer location
on higher ground. In order to protect the value of the home, a purchase price is agreed upon
beforehand “through a three-way agreement between the homeowner, FEMA, and the local
community or state that would establish a minimum purchase price” (Adler et al. 10323). Of
course, discounted premiums will not be sufficient to cover home values, so this option depends
upon the amount of funding available. Those who authorize funding must realize that, in the long
run, such a program would be mutually beneficial. The NFIP avoids repeatedly paying claims for
damage to risky homes, and homeowners are able to maintain their financial health while being
relocated out of harm’s way.
In order to concentrate the benefit of the discounts for buyouts program on families in
need, it would make sense to have requirements for eligibility. The goal of such a program would
be to assist low to middle class families with eventual relocation to a safer area, since wealthier
families have the ability to pay higher flood insurance premiums or choose to relocate without
the need for assistance. Factors such as home value and income provide a good view of the
financial strength of the owner. Using such criteria, “NRDC estimated that the NFIP could help
0.51 to 1.59 million eligible families move out of areas vulnerable to sea-level rise. NRDC
estimates indicate that acquiring all of these properties would cost from $52 billion to $163
billion between now and the end of the century” (Adler et al.10324). These values contain a good
deal of uncertainty, but clearly show the staggering cost of buyouts. However, “purchasing this
many properties would actually represent significant savings over the existing approach of
‘flood, rebuild, repeat’. NRDC estimates damages to the same pool of properties would be
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between $72 billion and $224 billion” (Adler et al.10324). It is important to note that these
estimates are as of the end of the century, and damages will continue to occur beyond that point
as well. On the other hand, the cost of purchasing these properties is a one time expense. Of
course, the NFIP cannot force homeowners to agree to a buyout, but the financial considerations
should serve as a strong motivation for families facing flood risk.
In order for the program to be as successful as possible, it is important to raise awareness
of flood risk. Homeowners are more likely to be interested in a discounts for buyouts program if
they understand its long term benefits. An accurate estimate of flood risk would encourage
homeowners to invest in loss mitigation measures, since they could clearly see the money this
would save. In addition, this information would deter new buyers from purchasing homes in
flood prone regions, which encourages long term migration out of floodplains. The NFIP would
find it less expensive to invest in raising awareness rather than continuing to repeatedly rebuild
damaged homes. For example, “a ‘public right-to-know’ provision could direct FEMA to create
a public, open-data system to share information related to a community’s or region’s flood risk,
such as current and historical policy information, the total number of multiple-loss properties in a
community, and whether a community was in compliance with the NFIP” (Adler et al. 10328). If
state and federal governments were to require sellers to disclose past flood related costs and
other relevant information, this would ensure buyers are fully aware of the risk. Currently, flood
disclosure laws are inconsistent between states, so the federal government could intervene to
mandate more useful laws across the board. Only a small portion of states already have sufficient
disclosure laws, as shown below.
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Figure 2: The five categories are based on the quality of state flood disclosure laws as of
June 2018. Relevant factors include disclosure of flood insurance requirements, past flood
damages, and whether the property is in a designated floodplain (Adler et al. 10330).
There remains a lot to be desired for flood disclosure laws in most states. If potential buyers had
access to this information, it would promote long term migration out of flood prone areas. A
discounts for buyouts program would not succeed if new homeowners continue to purchase these
properties, as this would necessitate more future buyouts. It will take significant time and money
to move people out of floodplains, so it is important to avoid steps in the wrong direction. FEMA
and the NFIP can take charge of this matter to some degree, but government cooperation would
optimize the process.
V. Catastrophe and Climate Modeling
Catastrophe modeling has been a useful tool in recent years to give insurers a better idea
of their exposure to tail events. A main issue with reconciling catastrophe models and climate
models is the difference in timescale. In essence, “catastrophe risk models typically provide a
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sophisticated understanding of potential insured loss over the next 12 months, while climate risk
models can project economic losses decades into the future” (Stärtzel et al.). Another relevant
consideration is that historical data is often used for modeling losses of future events. However,
this assumes that the past is indicative of the future, which will not be the case in a climate
changed world. In addition, the future climate is heavily dependent upon future greenhouse gas
emissions, so there is a great deal of uncertainty regarding the severity of climate change. As
such, more forward thinking methods will be necessary to create useful models. A potential
solution to these concerns is “dynamical modelling, using the current climatic status to initialise
predictions. This will enable more accurate short-term and seasonal forecasting, but will require
far more computational power” (Dlugolecki et al 18). For example, catastrophe models for
flooding can use current sea levels, rather than looking at historical data. In general, catastrophe
models will need to incorporate climate data and projections in order to produce accurate
forecasts of insurer risk in the future.
Another issue with modeling future risk for insurers is the interconnected nature of the
global economy and climate change. Most developed countries are currently equipped to deal
with the occasional natural disaster, but an increasing rate of severe catastrophes is likely to put a
strain on the economy. In addition, “financial markets can rapidly reprice assets that are exposed
to climate risk, affecting insurers’ investment portfolios and their own market valuations
negatively” (Grimaldi et al.). It is imperative for insurers to understand the economic effects of
climate risk, since they rely on investment income for profit. Therefore, insurers should consider
a twofold approach to modeling climate risk, by combining “detailed climate data, down to the
risk of a flood or fire for a single address, with an analysis of the macroeconomic implications of
climate change to inform pricing and portfolio adjustments” (Grimaldi et al.). It will take time
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for insurers to set long term business plans in motion, so it is of utmost importance to recognize
the issue as early as possible. Climate modeling will be an invaluable tool for making accurate
predictions in the face of the uncertainty of climate change.
A leading example in the insurance sector of using data to monitor climate change is the
Actuaries Climate Index, abbreviated as the ACI. According to the ACI website, the calculation
involves six components, each of which must be standardized prior to being combined for the
index. These components, referred to as standardized anomalies, are high temperature, low
temperature, heavy rainfall, drought, high wind, and sea level. Of course, there are other climate
change concerns which are not captured by this calculation. For example, “the ACI is calculated
for three-month meteorological seasons (and by month) for 12 large land regions in the United
States and Canada. At this temporal and geographical scale, tropical cyclones are relatively brief
occurrences that occur rarely in most of these regions and not at all in some” (Collins 3). Insurers
are familiar with the devastation caused by hurricanes, so it would be useful to have a method for
tracking tropical cyclone data. Fortunately, a convenient feature of the ACI methodology is its
applicability to other climate data and regions. One can create a standardized anomaly for a new
variable using the methodology of the index. Continuing with hurricanes as an example, there is
less historical data available due to the necessity of satellite data in monitoring the severity of
tropical cyclones. A useful variable to track, given the available data, would be accumulated
cyclone energy, known as ACE. Individual storms can be summed to measure global cyclone
energy over a time period, thus providing a reliable estimate of storm severity. Using the ACI
methodology, the standard anomaly for ACE is shown below.
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Figure 3: The trend of the ACE standard anomaly with different reference periods
It is worth noting that results produced under this methodology are highly dependent on the
reference period. According to these results, the standardized anomaly for ACE gives no
conclusive trend for cyclone energy in recent years. However, it is still worth monitoring in the
future as more data becomes available. By comparison, “the warm temperature component of the
Actuaries Climate Index, and global temperature studies, have shown rapidly increasing
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anomalies since the late 1970s. Evidence that these warmer temperatures, along with warmer
oceans, have increased the frequency and intensity of tropical cyclones remains to be seen”
(Collins 12). In essence, the ACI is a useful monitoring tool which can advise insurers on the
greatest dangers of climate change, and the methodology has great potential for application to
other climate concerns.
The applicability of the ACI makes it useful in a variety of scenarios, beyond simply
considering the potential climate related losses for insurers. Arguably, the impact on financial
markets is more relevant since insurers rely on investment income for profit. Currently, studies
indicate “that institutional investors are less aware of climate change risk and the market is not
adequately pricing the risk. As a result, investors could reduce ex-post risks through divestment
in some fossil fuel stocks” (Jiang 3). Insurers must carefully consider their investment portfolios
to identify their exposure to climate risk. In addition, it may be possible to earn extra profit if the
market is inefficient, meaning it is incorrectly pricing climate risk. As previously mentioned, the
ACI provides insight for a dozen regions in the United States and Canada. In order to see if the
ACI has predictive value, it makes sense to consider companies in these regions with great
exposure to climate risk, such as in the agricultural industry. Through the use of regression
models, it becomes clear that “as a type of production climate risk, ACI trends have an adverse
impact on agricultural production in Canada and the United States. This verifies the credibility of
ACI trends reflecting climate change risk” (Jiang 55). This implies that the ACI can predict the
profitability of agricultural companies, since profit is reliant on production. In addition, stock
prices generally depend upon the profitability of a company. As such, the ACI becomes useful
for investment strategies looking to exploit the inefficiencies of the market arising from climate
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risk. This example displays the versatility of the ACI, and indicates its potential for driving
insurer strategy, rather than being a simple monitoring tool.
VI. Crop Insurance
Most crop insurance is written by the federal government under the Federal Crop
Insurance Program, abbreviated as the FCIP. Farmers are provided with subsidized insurance,
meaning the program is a cost for the government. As discussed previously, the agricultural
sector is particularly vulnerable to the effects of climate change. Adaptation measures are
especially important for farmers since food production is at stake. In addition, preventative
action will be important for controlling the cost of the program in the future. As of today, some
of the “existing strategies available to farmers to respond to long-term changes in climatic
conditions include changing crops, the adoption of soil conservation and water harvesting
technologies” (Di Falco et al. 486). Some of the proposed solutions for the NFIP could be
applicable to the FCIP as well. For example, relocation efforts could save money in the long run
if climate change affects which lands are suitable for agriculture. Of course, there are several key
differences between the goals of these two programs. The NFIP is interested in assisting families
facing flood risk, which requires more attention to public policy. In addition, the program is not
meant to be a subsidy for people who want to live in floodplains. On the other hand, the FCIP
has historically been a subsidized program, and must maintain this costly strategy because it is
necessary for supporting the agricultural business. As such, it will require unique solutions due to
these differing goals.
Crop diversification can be a useful tool for farmers to mitigate losses in adverse
scenarios. If the harvest for a particular crop is ruined, at least there may be other crops to
provide some income for farmers and reduce the cost for the FCIP, so it would be mutually
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beneficial. However, it appears that “restricted access to insurance markets may drive much of
the observed crop diversification in the field as a means to manage risk. A quite different
situation appears when we consider agricultural systems in most developed countries where
insurance products are available. In this setting, very highly specialised agriculture is often
observed with much less crop diversity” (Di Falco et al. 499). Due to this effect, crop insurance
has an adverse impact on mitigation efforts, which is problematic for the insurer. One study
estimates a 3.5 percent and 22 percent increase in costs under moderate and higher emissions
scenarios, respectively. However, “if the study did not include adaptation in its models, the
estimates of cost increases would jump to 10 percent and 37 percent, under the moderate and
severe greenhouse gas concentration scenarios, respectively” (Crane-Droesch et al.). Adaptation
efforts will be a necessity for controlling the cost of the FCIP. Since it is a subsidized program,
premium incentives may be less effective for encouraging mitigation. Instead, the FCIP could
choose to only offer coverage to farmers meeting certain requirements.
Another concern with crop insurance is the expected decline in crop yield due to climate
change, namely due to increasing temperatures. There is a great deal of uncertainty in expected
yields due to the variability in emissions scenarios. As such, it may be difficult to predict which
regions will be best for agriculture in the future. Some of the most widely planted crops, such as
corn and soybeans, are particularly sensitive to extreme heat. As a result, “on average, climate
models project declining average corn and soybean yields, while changes to winter wheat are
modest and variable” (Crane-Droesch et al. 9). Anticipated changes in these expected yields are
shown below in different scenarios.
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Figure 4: Yield projections are based on averaged climate model simulations of the time
period 2060-2099. RCP4.5 and RCP8.5 refer to lower and higher emissions scenarios for
climate change, respectively (Crane-Droesch et al. 10)
Irrigation offers a noticeable improvement in expected yield for all scenarios, making it a useful
adaptation for farmers to consider. However, there are still widespread decreases in expected
yield in these optimistic scenarios, and FCIP policies usually pay a portion of market price to
compensate farmers for lost crops. Due to supply and demand, “because average prices are
driven by average production, the most pessimistic climate models in terms of yield show the
largest increases in price. This implies larger liabilities to be insured, which is a major driver of
increases in the cost of the FCIP Revenue Protection program” (Crane-Droesch et al. 15). In
response, premiums will rise to control the cost of the program. Decreased yields and higher
premiums should help to financially encourage farmers to relocate. Alternatively, the above
figure suggests irrigation as a promising option that would avoid relocation. Such adaptations
would help maintain the viability of the FCIP in worst case scenarios.
The effect of climate change on crop insurance is a widespread concern, since it is
relevant in every part of the country. On the other hand, only specific regions are susceptible to
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natural disasters such as floods and wildfires. For example, one of the main threats to agriculture
is rising temperatures. In theory, climate change will make some regions worse and others better
for farming purposes. However, relocation efforts may not be as effective as discussed with flood
insurance, since these temperature fluctuations may be unpredictable. In addition, moving a
family is a much simpler endeavor than relocating an entire farm. Therefore, adaptation will be
the key to controlling crop insurance costs. Drought resilience will be important for maintaining
crop production in the future. Irrigation solves the problem of a lack of rain, but would require
vast amounts of water, which may be difficult or expensive to obtain. A more feasible option
would be to utilize organic matter in soil, which researchers have argued “can retain more water
under vapor pressure deficit, protecting crops from losses induced by extreme heat and drought
better than low organic matter soils” (Kane et al. 1-2). The FCIP can promote such an adaptation
by requiring or incentivizing farmers to use such soil if they wish to buy crop insurance. The
relationship between soil organic matter and loss cost is shown below.

Figure 5: Higher levels of soil organic matter are associated with lower loss cost under
drought conditions (Kane et al. 6)

Fischler 22

Drought resilience measures increase expected crop yield, which decreases the expected losses
of policies. As a result, “soil organic matter is associated with reduced loss cost under drought
conditions and that the marginal effect of soil organic matter increases as drought severity
increases” (Kane et al. 6). The fact that its benefits are strongest in the most severe droughts
make it a much more favorable option than irrigation in the face of climate change. The FCIP
would find it mutually beneficial to share this information with farmers, since higher levels of
soil organic matter have been shown to reduce crop insurance payouts.
VII. Conclusion
Adaptation and relocation are the two constants between the discussed insurer responses
to the increased threat of natural disasters due to climate change. The more favorable option is
dependent upon the nature of the costs associated with the disaster. In the past, funds have been
wasted on repeatedly rebuilding in flood prone areas, leading to the conclusion that long term
relocation should be the goal of the NFIP. On the other hand, farmers with crop insurance should
focus on adaptation since there is no permanent safe zone for relocation. Extreme temperature
and drought are widespread issues, and the regions most susceptible to these threats can change
over time as climate change progresses. Both of these examples require forward thinking in order
to be properly executed, which places an ever greater importance on catastrophe and climate
modeling. Economic effects should be considered in modeling approaches, since climate change
will affect the market as well. For example, crop insurance could get more expensive as lower
yields drive up the market price of crops. The ACI has been shown to be a useful monitoring tool
for climate change, and has predictive capabilities as well. The success of the ACI reinforces the
idea that climate modeling should be an integral part of insurance modeling in the future. While
there are some potential legal avenues that could result in lower costs for insurers, the main focus
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should be on informing and incentivizing policyholders to behave optimally in response to the
threats of climate change. This will require careful planning by insurers and be most successful if
set in motion as soon as possible. Climate change will perhaps be the greatest challenge to date
for the insurance sector, and the most prepared companies have the potential to continue thriving
in an uncertain future.
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